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Summary 
Sophisticated computer modelling systems are widely used in engineering analysis.   
This paper takes examples from structural engineering, environmental engineering, 
flood management, and geotechnical engineering to illustrate the need for engineers 
to be competent in the use of computer tools.  Engineers must have an appreciation 
of the scientific basis of a model, its appropriateness, its numerical limitations, 
validation and verification, and understand how uncertainty propagates through the 
model before applying its results.  A review into the education and training of 
engineers is suggested in order to ensure engineers are competent at using 
computer modelling systems, particularly in the context of risk management. 
Keywords: Education and training; Design methods and aids; Mathematical 
modelling, Knowledge management 
Introduction 
Most civil, structural and environmental engineering analysis is nowadays 
undertaken with the aid of computer modelling.  Such modelling systems have 
undergone tremendous advances in recent years, and permit analysis of micro and 
macro problems. However, as models have advanced they have also become more 
complicated and sophisticated.  Users need to know whether a particular model is 
scientifically appropriate, validated, verified, and gives sensible results, before 
applying the model outputs.  The models have also become easier to use through, 
for example, the introduction of graphical user interfaces, and thus a wide range of 
users may feel confident in using the models. But these users may not have the 
same level of understanding of the underlying analysis, or physics etc., as expert 
analysts. It is obvious that uncritical and uninformed reliance on analysis software is 
detrimental in terms of safety, cost and best practice.  Ultimately this could lead to 
failures with disastrous consequences, ranging from economic loss or environmental 
damage, through to loss of life.  So, how should engineers embrace advances in 
computer modelling, in accordance with the expectations of society, while 
maintaining control of the associated risk?   
On Monday 19th September 2011, the Institution of Civil Engineers held an event 
entitled ‘Understanding our Analysis’ in order to open a dialogue on this subject.  The 
event comprised four presentations which drew attention to the dangers of a 
blinkered approach to analysis, i llustrated by examples taken from structural 
engineering, hydro-environmental modelling, flood management, and geotechnical 
engineering.  This paper has been written to disseminate to a wider audience the key 
points that arose during the event.   
A structural engineering perspective 
Two examples from structural engineering demonstrate where a poor understanding 
of modelling and associated analysis can cause major failures.  The first is the 
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Hartford Civic Center Arena roof failure in January 1978 in Connecticut, USA (see, 
for example, Martin and Delatte, 2001).  The roof was a space frame that collapsed 
one night after heavy snowfall, fortunately without any fatalities or injuries.  The roof 
was modelled using software that did not account properly for the eccentricity of the 
joints, where forces did not come together at a single point.  It was failure to 
recognise this shortcoming in the analysis (amongst other things) that led to the 
failure. Despite the significant advances in modelling since this time, ensuring that 
the model reflects reality with sufficient accuracy remains a key aspect .  The second 
example is Sleipner A, an offshore gravity platform that sank off the coast of Norway 
in August 1991.  A leak occurred in the cellular wall of the base of the platform when 
it was undergoing controlled ballasting as part of the deck mating procedure during 
installation (see Jakobsen and Rosendahl 1994; and Selby et al. 1997).  The inquiry 
discovered that a direct cause of the failure was a major error in the finite element 
analysis where an element in shear was not correctly modelled.  A ‘back of the 
envelope’ check involving a few lines of hand calculation would have shown that the 
shell element was insufficiently reinforced and so could not withstand the fluid 
loading. Although contemporary software has many more checks and balances it is 
still necessary for the modeller to fully appreciate the sensitivities and constraints 
when modelling complex structural components.   
Structural engineering is almost invariably safety critical, and so engineers have 
statutory responsibility to ensure their analysis is correct (or at least adequate to 
safeguard life).  It is vital that engineers are able to satisfy themselves that their 
numerical tools are properly validated, verified, and give sensible outputs.  The 
underlying assumptions and limitations of any model must be assessed.  Careful 
attention must be given to input data in terms of certainty and completeness.  
Validation provides assurance that the model is behaving as anticipated.  The 
outputs should be checked for correctness, ultimate limit state, and robustness.  
Sensitivity tests are a useful way to provide confidence in the results. Although a 
failure to predict serviceability performance will not endanger life, it may well have 
significant economic consequences.   
Engineers should understand both the analysis and the design aspects of computer 
packages many of which are integrated.  In design, challenges are often 
encountered that are not readily modelled, such as buildability, robustness, and local 
detailing, all of which must be properly considered.  It is essential that leading checks 
and initial design be undertaken before using the more sophisticated model.  As in 
many aspects of work, experience is an essential element of the design process and 
where this is not available it must be supplemented via supervision or checking and 
review procedures.  
Engineers are risk managers, and understanding analysis falls within this remit.  It 
seems obvious that engineering companies should adopt risk management policies 
which cover the professional competency of the team, hazard elimination and risk 
reduction, preliminary and alternative analysis procedures, software validation and 
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verification, sensitivity checks, and intermediate gateway checks (whereby the 
analysis or design cannot proceed until certain criteria have been met).   Universities 
also need to educate young engineers in the key concepts of modelling and risk 
management, including how to cope with uncertainty and incomplete data. 
An Environmental Engineering Perspective 
Nowadays, engineers increasingly use computational models for Environmental 
Impact Assessments because of the models’ apparent capability to represent 
processes at prototype scale.  Although such hydro-environmental models have 
grown in complexity, they can give erroneous results if used inappropriately by 
inexperienced users, with limited knowledge of both the models themselves and the 
complex processes being addressed.  Moreover, at universities, the undergraduate 
curriculum does not include some of the key science underpinning current, widely 
used, hydro-environmental analysis tools.  
Consider the numerical modelling of water quality in a typical estuarine basin.  The 
flow domain is first divided into a very large number of elements, and the seaward 
open boundary may be long and much unknown.  The computer software solves 
millions of discretised equations for conservation of mass, momentum, solutes, 
pollutants, sediments, metals, etc. However, it is often the case that users have not 
studied the derivation of the conservation equations being solved and yet use the 
software to compute solutions to complex hydro-environmental problems.   
Users need to be very aware of model limitations.  There are flow uncertainties 
related to the underlying assumptions, such as the hydrostatic pressure assumption, 
a constant wind stress, steady and uniform flow for the bed resistance term, and 
empirical representation for the bed resistance, turbulence, diffusion, dispersion, 
decay, etc.  Turning to water quality, there are further uncertainties, including the 
values of turbulent diffusion and dispersion coefficients; the variation of decay and 
kinetic rates with parameters such as temperature and sunlight; and the interaction 
of water quality indicators with salinity, sediments, etc., etc. 
There are also numerical model uncertainties.  These include the treatment of the 
advective terms in the momentum and transport equations, grid size, time step, open 
boundary data, stochastic inputs, and the accuracy and reliability of field data used 
for calibration and validation.  For example, much of the physical basis to the model 
representation is removed if a grid is too coarse, but too fine a grid may lead to 
excessive computational time requirements. Choice of time step should be such that 
it is not so large that periodic (e.g. tidal) behaviour is entirely missed or that the 
model becomes unstable, and not so small that the results are dissipative (see e.g. 
Abbott and Basco, 1989).  Formal grid convergence and stability tests are good 
practice (see e.g. Roache, 1998).  Open boundaries pose awkward problems both 
with regard to location (avoiding reflection back into the domain of information 
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propagating outwards) and the need for accurate input data.  A major factor is the 
experience and training of model users. 
An example is that of a hypothetical sewage effluent discharge entering Cardiff Bay, 
Wales, after a major international sports event at the Millennium Stadium.  In this 
case study (see Harris et al. 2002), the water quality is dependent on the bacterial 
decay rate of human effluent.  The majority of commercially available hydro-
environmental models use constant decay rates, but the bacterial decay rate of 
sewage is a function of sunlight, irradiance, depth, pH, temperature, turbidity etc.  
Measurements in Cardiff Bay have shown that the decay rate is best expressed as a 
combination of different day and night decay rates (noting that there is virtually no 
decay at night).  Model predictions using this more accurate decay rate show that the 
water quality varies considerably depending on the time the sewage is released into 
Cardiff Bay (Figure 1).  Had a constant decay rate been used, there would have 
been no difference between the results, which is incorrect.  
Hydro-environmental impact assessment studies are based on increasingly 
complicated software. As a consequence, hydro-environmental modellers require 
multidisciplinary skills, based on a thorough grounding in science and numerical 
methods.   
A Flood Modelling Perspective 
Flood modelling involves the use of numerical models to predict water flows, depths, 
velocities, inundation extents, etc. resulting from extreme events such as unusually 
heavy rainfall, storm surges, and dam breaks. Flood modelling is useful at assessing 
countermeasures and mitigation options.  It relies on geographical and hydrological 
input data, and on the software tools themselves. Most importantly, flood modelling 
relies on the people who develop and operate flood models, interpret results, and 
convey the information to stakeholders (such as homeowners, businesses, insurers, 
government agencies, politicians, etc.).  Inaccurate predictions can result in a range 
of problems, such as flood warnings not being issued when a flood is about to occur 
or flood defence works being under-designed – both of which can have negative 
socio-economic consequences.  
Good practice in flood modelling starts with a concept review, whereby an expert 
panel meets to identify the best modelling approach.  Data are then collected, and 
the model constructed and subjected to initial testing to assess the broad scale 
reasonableness of model behaviour when subject to sample input data. This initial 
testing may lead to changes in the model structure, input data o r review of 
observational data.  Next, model calibration is undertaken by adjusting input 
parameters until the predictions match observations (if available).  Particularly where 
observations are not available, sensitivity analysis is used to ‘sense check’ model 
outputs and derive data to support confidence statements.  A further model review is 
then undertaken (preferably by the same expert panel) to assess whether the model 
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is providing a sufficiently correct representation of reality for the intended use of the 
model.  If not, the model may undergo further calibration, or more data be acquired 
and input, or else the entire approach be changed.  Once the model is judged 
acceptable, production runs are undertaken to generate results.  A further formal 
review is recommended to assess whether the final outputs (e.g. flood maps) make 
sense. If approved, the results can then be used to inform decision making. 
Flood modelling underpins modern flood risk management.  Flood maps are used to 
locate new developments away from flood prone areas, to enhance emergency 
planning procedures, to carry out economic appraisal of different flood management 
options, to raise public awareness, and to provide information for insurance 
purposes.  Water levels predicted by flood mode ls are used in the design of flood 
defence works.  Importantly, flood modelling is used in flood forecasting to enable 
accurate and timely warnings to be issued.   
There are many issues that can arise.  For example, improper post-processing of 
perfectly valid results can lead to the production of highly inaccurate flood maps.  
Figure 2 shows what happened when an inexperienced user incorrectly applied GIS 
analysis to intersect the floodwater surface generated from 1D modelling of both the 
main river and its tributaries with a digital terrain model when producing a flood map.  
The upper map resulted from the incorrect analysis, which significantly 
overestimated the flood extent on the north side of the main river .  Although checks 
were performed, the error was not initially spotted due to there being no previous 
record of flooding in this area (and so it was impossible to compare the calculated 
with observed flood extents).  The lower map shows the corrected flood map  in 
which the water levels from the tributaries were excluded from the floodwater surface 
generated for the main river.  This example illustrates the additional difficulty in 
assessing flood modelling outputs where verification data are unavailable. 
Another issue is the probabilistic nature of the outputs of flood analysis.  Figures 3(a) 
and 3(b) show two different predictions of the flood extent map for a 1 in a 100 year 
event for Carlisle.  Both maps, though quite different, have been generated using the 
same model, but with slightly adjusted input parameters and different assumptions 
(e.g. flows in the different tributaries).  The first map (Figure 3(a)) provides what is 
probably the best estimate, with a 50% chance (or likelihood) that the flood extent 
will lie within the blue area; the second map a 96 % chance that the flood extent will 
lie within the blue area.  In both cases there is also a likelihood that the flooding 
could be outside the blue area.  The difference between these maps is not due to 
any errors in the processing, which involved 3000 different simulations taking 
account of various input data uncertainties and the influence of the tributaries.  In this 
case, there is no uniquely correct flood map.  Instead, the probabilistic approach to 
the analysis gives useful information to decision makers. 
Flood modelling only provides an approximate representation of reality.  There tend 
to be large residual uncertainties.  The modelling process involves many decision 
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steps at which different modellers may legitimately make different decisions.  Most 
importantly, the scarcity, natural randomness, and statistical non-stationarity in the 
environmental input data usually have a significant impact on results.  To help inform 
better decision making, there needs to be a move towards a method that includes 
communication of uncertainty and spatially varying flood likelihood (Beven et al, 
2010). Users would then be better able to assess whether the output information is 
good enough for what they are trying to achieve. 
Although major advances have occurred in flood modelling in the last 20 years, 
improvements need to be made to the analysis process through education and 
training of users.  Engineers need to understand the scientific and numerical 
fundamentals, know how to select, validate, verify, and use the most appropriate 
modelling approach, and know how to assess the outputs critically.  Users must 
develop a better appreciation as to how uncertainties in input data propagate through 
to the outputs.  It is vital that users are able to communicate clearly their findings to 
clients, the public, and other stakeholders.  Guidance documents are essential for 
improving analysis approaches.  Examples include European guidance on flood 
mapping good practice (EXCIMAP, 2007), a validation framework for flood modelling 
(Environment Agency, 2010a) and a framework for assessing uncertainty in flood 
risk mapping (Beven et al. 2011).  A significant contribution to benchmarking of 2D 
flood models is provided in Environment Agency (2010b). 
A Geotechnical Engineering Perspective 
Geotechnical engineering involves significant uncertainties, especially when one 
considers how little is known about the subterranean characteristics of any given 
site.  Competence, relevance, and performance are very important to geotechnical  
analysis.   
Society expects professional engineers to be competent – and this applies when 
engaged in analysis.  In practice however, misuse of software is not uncommon 
because of a lack of understanding of the underlying science including that of the 
chosen soil model.  Figure 4 shows a civil engineering failure of an excavation at 
Nicoll Highway, Singapore, in 2004, where four construction workers were killed.  An 
international panel of experts appointed by the Singapore government found that the 
collapse occurred because the engineer responsible for the analysis did not 
understand the software, the constitutive model, and the local ground conditions.  
Site investigations and analysis should be relevant.  Yet the routine ground 
investigations recommended by Eurocode 7 (2010a,b) do not provide the data 
needed for the constitutive models used in typical commercial analysis packages for 
Coulomb-hardening soft soils.  Consequently, it is necessary to use fudge factors 
and learn from experience, when applying the analysis package.  Then, the question 
is why not undertake relevant site investigations?  Given the many different 
constitutive models in commercial codes, which one should be selected for a given 
 8 
application?  In other words, is the constitutive model correct?  Do we understand 
the limitations?  Does this mean that any analysis can be at best an estimate of what 
is going to happen?  Eurocode 7 (2010a,b) states that “Knowledge of the ground 
conditions depends on the extent and quality of the geotechnical  investigations.  
Such knowledge and the control of workmanship are usually more significant to 
fulfilling the fundamental requirements than is precision in the calculation models and 
partial factors …. Reliable measurements of the stiffness of the ground are often 
very difficult to obtain from field or laboratory tests.  In particular, owing to sample 
disturbance and other effects, measurements obtained from laboratory specimens 
often underestimate the in-situ stiffness of the soil …. Observations of the behaviour 
of previous constructions should therefore be analysed wherever available.”  
Eurocode 7 (2010b) places more emphasis on understanding ground conditions than 
improving calculation models.  A paradigm shift is occurring from the use of failure 
criteria to fitness of purpose.  Consequently stiffness measurements are necessary.  
But the sampling procedure alters the ground stiffness, making it almost impossible 
to obtain the characteristic stiffness using routine investigation.  Of great importance 
is the need for more observations of existing structures in order to validate any 
analysis.  In the UK ground investigations are often not fit for purpose.  Ground 
conditions can be extremely variable.  Are the analysis models suitable for soil?  
What are the effects of assumptions in the numerical model on the analysis? Does a 
database exist by which to validate the analysis for a new site?  What are the 
limitations of the analysis?  The programmers probably do know these, but what 
about the users? 
Performance depends on data.  In geotechnical engineering, the implementation of 
Eurocode 7 highlights the need for regional databases of geological and 
geotechnical information to improve the selection of characteristic design values and 
to reduce uncertainties in assigning design values.  Three-dimensional geological 
and geotechnical ground models will lead to risk reduction by improving the detailed 
representation of the ground.  The performance of geotechnical structures needs 
monitoring and assessment.  Case studies are badly needed for reference by 
geotechnical engineers.  To enhance future designs, it is vital that understanding be 
improved of the performance of geotechnical structures.  
Concluding Remarks 
We live in a world which is getting ever more complex.  Civil, structural and 
environmental engineers have to collect information, analyse it, and then apply the 
results.  There is no failsafe against incompetence or negligence – so if users carry 
out analysis without fully understanding what they are doing, then the likelihood of 
failure and possibly disaster is increased.  Society expects engineers to be 
competent, or to be under suitable supervision, which infers a contemporary 
understanding of their analysis and its application.  Engineers have a duty to be 
aware of relevant key publications such as codes of practice, journal articles, key 
text books and guidance documents. This needs to be appreciated by all engineers. 
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Only users with proven competency should be permitted to model complicated 
processes using sophisticated computational techniques.  Field data are vitally 
important for model validation.  Engineers require education (at university) and 
training (in industry) in order to develop the skill sets necessary to cope with the 
demands of modern analysis techniques.  Three key words summarise what is 
required: competence, relevance, and performance.  
It is time that a review is undertaken into the education and training of engineers in 
order to prepare them to be competent users of modern computer modelling systems  
and be risk managers.  A bipartite action plan is needed: one aspect looking at 
management policies, the other looking at education. 
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Figure Titles 
Figure 1  Model simulations for two hypothetical coliform spills into Cardiff Bay for 
effluent releases from Cardiff Millenium Centre (top left) and Sewage Treatment 
Works (bottom right) at: (a) 4 pm; and (b) 4 am, for different decay rates for day-time 
(08:00-17:00) and night-time (17:00-08:00) respectively.  The simulations highlight 
the importance of incorporating the correct physics, in this case a combination of day 
and night decay rates, in the model. 
 
Figure 2  Example flood mapping problem: (upper) incorrect post-processing due to 
a user incorrectly applying GIS analysis to determine the water surface predicted by 
a 1D hydraulic model by intersection with a digital terrain model; and (lower) 
corrected post-processing when the user excluded the overlaying of water levels 
from tributaries on the primary river floodwater surface elevations.  The problem was 
not straightforward to identify due to a lack of validation data. 
Figure 3  Flood extent maps illustrating the likelihood of 1 in 100 year flood extent for 
Carlisle, England: (a) 50% likelihood; (b) 96% likelihood (flood maps provided by the 
University of Lancaster for the Flood Risk Management Research Consortium – see 
www.lancs.ac.uk/staff/leedald/Carlisle/visualisation.html).  The maps illustrate the 
application of a probabilistic approach to the understanding of flood extent. 
Figure 4  Excavation failure at Nicoll Highway, Singapore, in 2004.  This shows the 
collapse of a retaining wall during the construction of the Singapore MRT.  The 
investigations suggested that the most likely cause of the collapse lay in the design 
of the retaining wall which proved insufficient to support the earth pressures.  This 
was attributed to the use of an inappropriate soil model which overestimated the soil 
strength at the site and underestimated the forces on the retaining walls in the 
excavation. 
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Figure 3  Flood extent maps illustrating the likelihood of 1 in 100 year flood extent for 
Carlisle, England: (a) 50% likelihood; (b) 96% likelihood (flood maps provided by the 
University of Lancaster for the Flood Risk Management Research Consortium – see 
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Figure 4  Excavation failure at Nicoll Highway, Singapore, in 2004.  This shows the 
collapse of a retaining wall during the construction of the Singapore MRT.  The 
investigations suggested that the most likely cause of the collapse lay in the design 
of the retaining wall which proved insufficient to support the earth pressures.  This 
was attributed to the use of an inappropriate soil model which overestimated the soil 
strength at the site and underestimated the forces on the retaining walls in the 
excavation. 
